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The Bering Strait




aritime corridors such as the 
Straits of Hormuz and the 
Bab al-Mandeb have long been 
vitally important to the interests of the 
United States and the global commu-
nity. Now due to Russia’s and China’s 
interests and activities in the Arctic, the 
Bering Strait is an emerging maritime 
corridor that is becoming increasingly 
vital to the economic and national 
security interests of the United States 
and its allies. Once a region of coopera-
tion between the Soviet Union and the 
United States, rapidly changing envi-
ronmental conditions and the resulting 
increase in human activity have made 
the Arctic an arena for potential Great 
Power competition between Russia, 
China, and the United States. The 
Navy foretold the Bering Strait’s sig-
nificance in 2013 when it published its 
U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap: 2014–2030, 
asserting that 
this 51-mile-wide strait between Russia 
and the United States . . . will become a 
more important security planning con-
sideration as maritime activity continues 
to increase. . . . As the Pacific gateway for 
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Russia’s Northern Sea Route, the Bering 
Strait will become increasingly important for 
seaborne trade between Europe and Asia.1
Any threat, perceived or real, to the 
freedom of access to these maritime cor-
ridors usually elicits a strong and swift 
response by the United States and its 
allies. Although the importance of the 
Bering Strait is increasingly being rec-
ognized throughout the Department of 
Defense (DOD), the United States still 
faces several obstacles to achieving the 
strategic objectives outlined in the Navy’s 
roadmap, namely to “ensure United 
States Arctic sovereignty and provide 
homeland defense,” “provide ready naval 
forces to respond to crises and contingen-
cies,” “preserve freedom of the seas,” and 
“promote partnerships within the United 
States Government and with interna-
tional allies and partners.”2
In particular, because the Bering Strait 
lies at the boundary of three geographic 
combatant commands (GCCs), increased 
adversary activity around the strait cre-
ates challenges for unity of effort among 
those combatant commands. Moreover, 
since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
United States has invested little in Arctic 
capabilities, and since 2014, the United 
States and its allies have focused personnel 
and resources on deterring Russian aggres-
sion around northern Europe.3
As a result, the United States finds it-
self in a position of weakness in the region. 
If steps are not taken to correct these vul-
nerabilities, the Bering Strait will almost 
certainly become a region like the South 
China Sea or the Baltic region, where 
competition, harassment, and intimidation 
threaten its status as a place of peaceful 
cooperation and exploration. To meet the 
challenges posed by the rapidly changing 
security environment in the Arctic and the 
Bering Strait in particular, U.S. Northern 
Command (USNORTHCOM) should 
establish Combined Joint Task Force 
(CJTF) in Alaska. A CJTF in Alaska, 
like CJTFs in other parts of the world, 
would enable the necessary conditions 
to integrate the full effects of the joint 
force across land, sea, air, space, and cy-
berspace warfare domains; create a venue 
for military cooperation among partners 
with Arctic interests; and ensure that U.S. 
adversaries do not exploit gaps created at 
the far boundaries of the GCC areas of 
responsibility (AORs).
External Challenges: 
Russian and Chinese 
Interests in the Arctic
To fully appreciate the exigency of 
establishing a CJTF in Alaska, it is 
necessary to understand Russian and 
Chinese interests and activities in the 
Arctic. Russia’s military assertiveness 
in the region is a strong indicator of 
its ambitions. In December 2015, 
President Vladimir Putin stated in his 
National Security Strategy that 
leadership in exploiting the resources of the 
world’s oceans and the Arctic is acquiring 
particular significance. . . . An entire spec-
trum of political, financial-economic, and 
informational instruments have been set in 
motion in the struggle for influence in the 
international arena.4 
To achieve its geostrategic objectives 
in the Arctic, Russia has established 
the Northern Fleet Joint Strategic 
Command, embarked on large-scale 
investment in Arctic airfields and ports,5 
and initiated the development of dis-
crete Arctic military capabilities such 
as the Northern Fleet’s Arctic Motor-
ized Rifle Brigade6 and “Arctic-proof” 
drones that can withstand the region’s 
severe climatic conditions.7 This Arctic 
investment was on full display during 
Russia’s strategic exercise Vostok-18, 
when units of the Arctic Motorized 
Rifle Brigade conducted an amphibious 
insert on the Chukotka Peninsula and 
executed a tactical foot movement from 
its insertion point to an undisclosed 
location along the Pacific coastline while 
the Northern Fleet conducted multiple 
amphibious landings and search-and-res-
cue missions throughout the exercise.8
In addition to developing Arctic 
capabilities, Russia is investing in Arctic 
infrastructure to enable operations and 
has developed a system of military facili-
ties—radar stations, air bases, and ports. 
Its militarization of the Arctic sends 
clear signals to the other Arctic littoral 
countries that it seeks to assert itself as the 
dominant Arctic power.
But Russia is not the only power with 
its eyes on the Arctic. Potential economic 
and ambiguous international regula-
tions, as well as a lack of institutional 
governance, are already enticing China to 
position itself as a powerful stakeholder 
in Arctic affairs. China is looking north to 
use the Arctic sea lines of communication 
as a third belt in its massive infrastructure 
network dubbed the Belt and Road 
Initiative.9 All Chinese maritime traffic 
utilizing Russia’s Northern Sea route 
will have to transit the Bering Strait in 
order to travel between the Chinese 
port at Dalian to the port in Rotterdam, 
Netherlands. To further its economic 
interests in the region, China is wielding 
its soft-power weapons to gain leverage. 
It has invested in nuclear-powered ice-
breakers and increased its foreign direct 
investment in such countries as Finland 
and Norway, with ambitions to establish 
a Chinese-Arctic corridor that connects 
China with European markets.10 In only a 
few years, such trans-Arctic shipping will 
become an economically viable alternative 
to the Suez Canal and cut travel time be-
tween Shanghai and northwestern Europe 
by approximately 18 to 27 percent.11 
Thus, it was unsurprising that, after visit-
ing with President Donald Trump in 
April 2017, Chinese President Xi Jingping 
stopped in Alaska to meet with Governor 
Bill Walker, attempting to find opportuni-
ties for Chinese investment in Alaska.12
China’s interests in the Arctic may 
not be purely economic, however, but 
might also involve national security. 
China views the Aleutian Islands as the 
northernmost extent of the first island 
chain, a series of islands extending from 
the Aleutians in the northeast down 
through the Philippine archipelago in the 
southwest.13 The Chinese, a historically 
seafaring nation, see these islands as barri-
ers used by the United States and its allies 
to limit their power projection capabilities 
by restricting their maneuverability.14 
Seen from this perspective, freedom of 
maneuver through the Aleutian Islands 
and Bering Strait in order to access the 
Arctic’s natural resources and trade routes 
is of great strategic importance for China.
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Both China and Russia are taking 
the long view in their Arctic strategies, 
setting the necessary conditions to assert 
themselves in the region. As noted in the 
British publication The Observer, “A great 
chess game is being played with countries 
staking claims to the Arctic to make sure 
they are not left out. . . . Some countries, 
like China, are looking 50 years ahead.”15
External Challenges
In other regions where they have 
interests, both China and Russia secure 
those interests through increased 
militarization, employing antiaccess/
area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities from 
sovereign territory to control strategic 
maritime corridors, and they could take 
the same approach around the Bering. 
In late 2017, China constructed military 
infrastructure on Subi, Mischief, and 
Fiery Cross reefs in the South China 
Sea.16 This infrastructure, including a 
military airfield, is believed to consist of 
hardened facilities for the deployment 
of radars, antiship and antiair missile 
launchers, and combat aircraft. China 
uses these activities to secure its claims 
to natural resources and extend its 
influence over that strategic maritime 
corridor in an attempt to reduce U.S. 
sway over what China considers to be its 
rightful area of influence.17
Similar to Chinese actions in the 
South China Sea, Russia’s deployments of 
A2/AD capabilities in the Black Sea and 
Kaliningrad offer operational planners 
insight into what a Russian land-based 
A2/AD “bubble” in the vicinity of the 
Bering Strait might look like: a nearly im-
penetrable, three-dimensional area where 
the United States and its allies would be 
under the threat of attack across  surface, 
sub-surface, air, and electromagnetic 
domains.18 With Russia’s increased invest-
ment in infrastructure in the Arctic, it has 
the ability to create such an integrated 
network of sensors and shooters in and 
around the Bering Strait. The Sopka-2 
radar system on Wrangel Island is a three-
dimensional dual-use S-band air-route 
radar with a range of 350 kilometers.19 
Though not a significant threat in isola-
tion, this radar—potentially employed as 
a part of an integrated network of Russian 
land-based antiship cruise missiles, elec-
tronic warfare systems, and ground-based 
mobile air defense systems in the Bering 
Strait—would pose a formidable obstacle 
to the United States and its allies’ ability 
to access the Arctic.
That said, given the concentration of 
Russian A2/AD assets being employed 
elsewhere, it is unlikely that Russia will 
employ them around the Bering Strait in 
the near term. Instead, Russia will likely 
Crew of U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Maple follows Canadian Coast Guard Icebreaker Terry Fox through icy waters of Franklin Strait, in Nunavut Canada, August 
11, 2017 (U.S. Coast Guard/Nate Littlejohn)
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adopt the role of Arctic intimidator, 
using a complement of electromagnetic 
sensors and electronic warfare capabilities 
to collect information about and probe 
and harass countries it deems competi-
tors in the region. There is evidence that 
this is already happening. During the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) multinational large-scale ex-
ercise Trident Juncture-18, Russia was 
accused of employing global positioning 
system jamming measures from the Kola 
Peninsula, a border region with Norway 
and Finland, on NATO aircraft flying 
in support of the exercise.20 The former 
head of NATO’s Emerging Threats 
Division characterized Russia’s behavior 
as follows: “We’ve seen transmitters 
going down mysteriously in Sweden, 
hacking of soldiers’ personal devices 
in the Baltics, disruptions to mobile 
phone networks in Lithuania during 
maritime exercises and so on.”21 Without 
a complement of responses from the 
United States and its allies, the sum ef-
fect of these more aggressive tactics in 
the Bering Strait is a normalization of 
bad behavior that threatens access to 
the region, potentially creating a situa-
tion in which the United States and its 
allies would only be able to access this 
maritime corridor under the threat of 
nonkinetic or even kinetic attack.
Internal Challenges: Command 
and Control and Balanced Forces
In addition to the challenges China and 
Russia pose in the Arctic, the United 
States faces a number of internal chal-
lenges. One is that the Bering Strait 
exposes a potential seam at the edges 
of three GCC AOR boundaries: U.S. 
Indo-Pacific Command, U.S. European 
Command, and USNORTHCOM. As 
human activity increases and China and 
Russia seek to further assert themselves 
in the Arctic, the task of effectively 
identifying and tracking potential 
threats across multiple warfare domains 
will challenge the coordination and 
unity of effort of these commands. 
The 2011 update of the U.S. Unified 
Command Plan boundaries illumi-
nates the command and control (C2) 
challenges the Bering Strait presents. 
For example, a Russian navy surface 
combatant traveling from the North-
ern Fleet port at Murmansk along the 
Northern Sea route toward Vladivostok 
to link up with the Russian Pacific Fleet 
would have to pass through the Bering 
Strait and the maritime waters of three 
GCCs. An individual GCC has the 
authority to plan operations and operate 
its forces whenever and wherever 
they are required to accomplish their 
mission. However, any cross-AOR oper-
ations or activities require coordination 
with the affected GCC.22 Russia and 
China know well the Unified Command 
Plan and will look to exploit the gaps at 
the AOR boundaries. The current U.S. 
institutional conception of geographic 
responsibility will thus challenge the 
unity of effort required to respond to 
security issues in the Bering Strait.
Another challenge to U.S. efforts 
in the Arctic is that the Euro-centric 
focus on the Russian threat has diverted 
personnel and resources away from the 
growing threats that Russia and China 
pose in and around the Bering Strait. The 
eight littoral Arctic countries (Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, 
Russia, Sweden, and the United States) 
are either NATO or European powers 
and, as a result, have drawn U.S. atten-
tion and resources toward the European 
Arctic to meet their collective defense 
needs.
Since the annexation of Crimea 
and invasion of Ukraine by Russia, the 
Pentagon has responded by initiating 
Operation Atlantic Resolve, which has 
established enduring rotational units 
and commands to reassure the Alliance 
and deter further Russian aggression in 
Europe. Recognizing Norway’s strategic 
position and unique security challenges, 
the U.S. Marine Corps has prioritized 
support to contingency operations in 
NATO’s northern flank by eliminating 
rotational forces to the Black Sea region 
and reallocating forces to Norway as 
Marine Rotational Force–Europe.23 The 
U.S. Army has committed a regionally 
aligned division headquarters in Poland 
with armored and aviation brigade com-
bat teams with support from logistics task 
forces on 9-month rotations in Northern 
Europe.24 In 2018, the U.S. Navy rees-
tablished Second Fleet with the stated 
mission to develop and dynamically 
employ maritime forces ready to fight 
across multiple domains in the Atlantic 
and Arctic in order to ensure access; deter 
aggression; and defend U.S., allied, and 
partner interests.25 This surge of person-
nel and resources toward Europe has left 
little capacity to devote forces to address 
emerging threats in and around the 
Bering Strait. With little to no Navy or 
Marine Corps forces stationed in Alaska, 
the United States finds itself unbalanced 
across the Pacific and Atlantic sides of the 
Arctic.
The United States will have to de-
velop an Arctic strategy that views the 
Bering Strait as a strategic maritime 
corridor serving as the bridge between 
the growing threats in Asia and Europe. 
The critical task will be to balance forces 
across the Arctic region to ensure that 
China and Russia do not exploit the 
physical gaps and organizational seams 
created by the current imbalances be-
tween forces assigned to the European 
and Asian regions of the Arctic and the 
combatant command boundaries.
Combined Joint Task 
Force–Alaska: Leveraging 
Partnerships to Win Early
Ensuring access to the Arctic by con-
trolling the Bering Strait is a global 
issue, one that requires participation 
from U.S. Asian and European allies, 
including NATO, Japan, and South 
Korea, which have commercial and 
security interests in the Arctic. There-
fore, we need a CJTF; it has a track 
record of success in addressing the 
very institutional issues and foreseeable 
threats emerging in the Bering Strait. 
Alaska is an ideal location to establish 
a CJTF to demonstrate to China and 
Russia that the United States takes 
access to the Arctic seriously.
One reason a CJTF would be effective 
is that it would necessitate establishing a 
combined joint operation area (CJOA) 
with sufficient land, sea, and air space—a 
critical first step toward ensuring unity 
of effort when conducting operations at 
the geographic boundaries of contiguous 
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areas of operation. As defined in Joint 
Publication 3-0, Operations, “A CJOA is 
an area of land, sea, and airspace, defined 
by a geographic combatant commander 
or subordinate unified commander, in 
which a joint force commander . . . con-
ducts military operations to accomplish 
a specific mission.”26 In the case of the 
Bering Strait, this CJOA would create an 
area owned by one commander, thereby 
streamlining decisionmaking by routing it 
through only one GCC.
Another virtue of the CJTF as a 
solution to the Bering Strait problem 
is that it would create an institutional 
platform for cooperation among allied 
and partner nations, thereby providing 
the necessary balance of forces across the 
Arctic region. Japan and South Korea, 
both seafaring nations and close allies 
of the United States, look to the Arctic 
for access to hydrocarbons, minerals, 
and fisheries.27 Their participation in 
CJTF–Alaska would serve to enhance 
their ability to protect their economic 
and security interests in the North Pacific 
and the Arctic, while the CJTF could 
leverage their icebreakers and ice-class 
ships to bolster the coalition’s presence in 
the Arctic. Both Japan and South Korea 
could increase rotational training oppor-
tunities for their air forces and armies at 
the Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex 
and further develop their amphibious 
capabilities in partnership with the U.S. 
Marines at Adak Island in the Aleutian 
Island chain.28
As with Asian allies, a CJTF in Alaska 
would likely draw interest from NATO 
and our European allies, serving as a 
welcome opportunity for Europe’s non-
NATO members to contribute to global 
security and cooperation outside the 
auspices of NATO. Finland and Sweden, 
non-NATO Arctic countries, would 
benefit greatly from cooperating with the 
Alliance in a non-NATO military struc-
ture. Likewise, inviting both countries to 
participate in CJTF-Alaska would bring 
valuable Arctic military experience to the 
team. Recognizing the growing threats to 
their security, the United States, Sweden, 
and Finland signed a nonbinding trilat-
eral security agreement in 2018. All three 
countries recognized the need to increase 
their military interoperability, specifically 
by planning and executing joint training 
exercises.29 Increasing this allied presence 
in Alaska would balance the force posture 
on both sides of the Arctic and bring 
much needed Arctic capabilities to bear.
CJTF-Alaska is not merely an effec-
tive but hypothetical solution; it is an 
altogether logistically achievable one, as 
it could capitalize on the existing facilities 
and personnel force structure of Alaska 
Command (ALCOM), a sub-unified joint 
command of USNORTHCOM head-
quartered in Anchorage and commanded 
by an Air Force three-star general. 
ALCOM could readily serve as the foun-
dation of a CJTF headquarters. The rest 
of the personnel needed could be globally 
sourced by USNORTHCOM through 
the Request for Forces process. Both the 
Air Force and the Army have significant 
capabilities in Alaska and would not 
require additional forces above discrete 
capabilities needed to compete across 
warfare domains. With little Navy and 
Marine Corps presence, the CJTF might 
be better served employing rotational 
Navy and Marine Corps forces. As noted 
by Walker Mills, shorter “deployment for 
training periods of one or two months 
to Alaska would still offer much better 
training opportunities while limiting the 
impact to our global force model and 
current deployment commitments.”30 
This concept of rotational forces would 
also apply to U.S. multinational partners 
and would go a long way toward enhanc-
ing multinational interoperability.
Alaska also serves as an ideal loca-
tion for a standing CJTF headquarters 
because it has the established military 
infrastructure, including 32 military 
facilities and 12 major bases and stations, 
to meet the military demands of the 
rapidly increasing human activity in the 
Arctic region. With well-established and 
ready-to-use resources, Alaska would 
facilitate security cooperation training 
across all warfare domains with coalition 
partners. Alaska’s Joint Pacific Alaska 
Range Complex (JPARC) has 65,000 
square miles of airspace, 2,560 square 
miles of land space, and 42,000 square 
nautical miles of surface, sub-surface, and 
overlying airspace in the Gulf of Alaska. 
Accredited a Joint National Training 
Capability, JPARC is a resource that en-
sures training is conducted under realistic 
conditions across warfare domains.31 The 
port of Alaska in Anchorage is another 
ready-to-use capability that the state has 
to offer. During the height of combat 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the 
port supported more than 20 military 
deployments and the onward movement 
of 18,000 pieces of military equipment.32 
It has direct access via secure rail lines 
to major military installations and year-
round accessibility, allowing the United 
States and its allies to deploy rotational 
forces and equipment with ease.
Redesignating ALCOM as a standing 
CJTF headquarters and inviting countries 
to participate in a coalition come with 
little opportunity cost in the near term; 
serve to demonstrate U.S. resolve to 
deter malign activity in the Bering Strait; 
set a strategic anchor on the Pacific side 
of the Arctic sea lines of communication; 
and complement the military planning 
and security cooperation that has hereto-
fore been focused on the threats on the 
European side of the Arctic.
The CJTF headquarters is a proven 
model that fosters cooperation and collab-
oration. Establishing a CJTF headquarters 
in Alaska would signal to U.S. partners 
across the globe that Washington is taking 
the necessary steps to address the growing 
security challenges in the Arctic. The CJTF 
is not a novel idea but rather a time-tested 
model that fosters integration and unity 
of effort and clearly signals U.S. resolve 
to adversaries. Controlling the Bering 
Strait, in concert with sea control efforts 
in the European Arctic, would provide the 
essential security necessary to deter aggres-
sion so the Arctic remains a place where 
peaceful nations can coexist without fear of 
interference or intimidation. JFQ
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nent Structured Cooperation. They 
fear that a more capable EU would 
make it a competitor to NATO 
for European security issues, and 
in so doing reduce U.S. influence 
in European security. Concerns 
about diminished U.S. influence 
and EU divergence from NATO as 
a result of PESCO are misguided. 
Rather than be concerned about 
the remote possibility of European 
strategic autonomy, the United 
States should throw its full support 
behind the PESCO initiative and 
other attempts to strengthen 
European defense. That said, the 
United States has an interest in 
the direction that the EU takes 
with PESCO and should therefore 
attempt to shape it constructively.
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